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SUBTERRANEAN POLITICS BLUES 
R. Shep Melnick 
KAREN ORREN AND STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLICY STATE: AN AMERICAN 
 PREDICAMENT (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2017). PP. 272. HARDCOVER 
$25.95. 
 
STEPHEN B. BURBANK AND SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
 COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2017).  PP. 292. HARDCOVER $105.00. PAPERBACK 
$34.99. 
One of the benefits of studying American politics is that we routinely confront 
important changes in the real world. A political science professor who lazily recycles 
decades-old lectures would merit the ridicule he would inevitably receive from his 
students. For example, for many decades we could repeat the nostrum that our two major 
political parties are internally heterogeneous “umbrella” parties. No longer. Similarly, 
during most of the twentieth century, we could explain to students that the real work of 
Congress is done in committees. Not now. This means there is always something new to 
examine and explain. In the humanities, those looking for dissertation and book topics 
must offer new (often wildly implausible) interpretations of a well-known work, or claim 
to have discovered new works of previously unrecognized importance. All we political 
scientists need to do, in contrast, is read the newspaper and identify developments that do 
not fit the conventional academic wisdom. 
The challenge, then, is to distinguish those developments that are temporary and 
ephemeral from those that are more long-lasting and fundamental. Is Trump just a fluke 
or the harbinger of things to come? Within six years that man in the White House will be 
gone. Will Trumpism (whatever that is) remain? What features of our political system 
allowed such an aberrant figure to be nominated and elected? 
Two features of American politics during the past half century will definitely not be 
going away soon, and they affect virtually every aspect of our politics. The first is the 
relentless growth of government. First in the 1930s and again in the 1960s the federal 
government took on a wide variety of new responsibilities, in the process lowering what 
James Q. Wilson has called the “legitimacy barrier.”1 Once it becomes widely 
                                                          
 1. James Q. Wilson, American Politics: Then & Now, COMMENTARY (Feb. 1979), https://www.commentary 
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acknowledged that the Constitution imposes few limits on the legitimate authority of the 
federal government, political conflict takes a very different form: 
New programs need not await the advent of a crisis or an extraordinary majority, because no 
program is any longer ‘new’—it is seen, rather, as an extension, a modification, or an 
enlargement of something the government is already doing. . . . Since there is virtually 
nothing the government has not tried to do, there is little it cannot be asked to do.2 
Today the federal government even tries to regulate name-calling on school 
playgrounds,3 to determine whether “competitive cheer and tumbling” is a “sport,”4 and 
to establish the essential rules of golf.5 
The second feature is the distinctive politics of retrenchment, that is, taking away 
benefits and privileges previously granted. Starting with Paul Pierson’s seminal 1994 book 
Dismantling the Welfare State? political scientists have helped us understand why frontal 
assaults on established programs usually fail and what sort of indirect strategies sometimes 
succeed.6 Human being’s innate “loss aversion” leads them to fiercely oppose benefit cuts. 
Such cuts also tend to attract attention from well-organized constituencies. And the 
multiple veto points in the American political system offer many opportunities for these 
groups to register their opposition. The more accessible and transparent the institution, the 
more difficulties it will face in cutting existing programs. 
These two features of contemporary politics are opposite sides of the same coin. Big 
government imposes highly visible costs, breeds resentment, and therefore produces 
crusades to “drain the swamp.” Often retrenchment pits small-government conservatives 
against defenders of the welfare and regulatory state. But since those on the left hope to 
enact many expensive new programs—far too expensive to be funded merely by taxing 
the “one percent”—they, too, will need to find ways to trim some existing programs. When 
one considers the large federal deficit, the aging of our population, and state governments’ 
huge unfunded pension liability, it is clear that our budget plight is so dire as to make 
retrenchment in some form inevitable. As Herb Stein famously noted, anything that “can’t 
go on like this forever” won’t.7 
The two books under review here are different in many ways. Orren and 
Skowronek’s The Policy State is a work of unusually broad sweep, backed by a wealth of 
examples and filled with provocative insights.8 Only authors who have spent years 
studying American politics and history could have written it. It is also an unusually dense 
and at times maddeningly abstract book. After several readings I still have trouble 
following some of their arguments. On the first page the authors write, “policy has become 
                                                          
magazine.com/articles/american-politics-then-now/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Russlynn Ali, Dear Colleague Letter on Bullying, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC (2010), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.html. 
 4. R. SHEP MELNICK, THE TRANSFORMATION OF TITLE IX: REGULATING GENDER EQUALITY IN EDUCATION 
7–9 (2018). 
 5. PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
 6. PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE? REAGAN, THATCHER, AND THE POLITICS OF 
RETRENCHMENT 108 (1995). 
 7. Herbert Stein, My Foreign Debt, WALL ST. J. 24 (May 10, 1985). 
 8. See KARREN OREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLICY STATE: AN AMERICAN PREDICAMENT (2017). 
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an enigmatic omnipresence.”9 Two hundred pages later, the precise meaning of “the policy 
state” remains somewhat enigmatic to the reader—at least this one. 
Burbank and Farhang’s book, in contrast, is tightly focused, clearly written, and 
convincingly argued.10 They examine in detail one important part of our “policy state,” 
namely, post-1980 efforts to curtail the use of private law suits to enforce federal statutory 
rights They combine a careful review of congressional, administrative, and judicial activity 
with quantitative analysis of Supreme Court decisions.  They show that while legislative 
and quasi-administrative efforts to curb such private litigation have largely failed, the 
Supreme Court’s conservative majority has achieved the same objective through a large 
number of seemingly technical rulings. This is important because Farhang’s previous work 
has shown how important private enforcement is for civil rights law and for enforcement 
of the many strings attached to federal grants.11 Like Sarah Staszak’s No Day in Court: 
Access to Justice and the Politics of Rights Retrenchment,12 Burbank and Farhang provide 
a valuable service by bringing the courts into the retrenchment picture 
Despite the obvious differences between these two books, Rights and Retrenchment 
offers a vivid example of the sort of politics The Policy State describes in more abstract 
terms. Burbank and Farhang show that important policy issues are being described in 
technical terms unintelligible to most voters. Orren and Skowronek help us understand the 
peculiar nature of the statutory rights that lie at the center of Supreme Court debates. The 
Policy State addresses the underlying causes of partisan polarization, Rights and 
Retrenchment some of its previously unrecognized consequences. 
What are the distinctive features of the “policy state” and why do they define the 
“American predicament”? Orren and Skowronek concede that all governments make 
policy; from the outset both the federal government and the states have established policies 
on a wide array of matters.13 Yet they also insist that policy “is one way of governing 
among others, and not the principle way America was governed originally.”14 The shift 
from the old regime to the “policy” regime was not simply a matter of quantity. Although 
the cumulative effect of the growth of government responsibility was clearly significant, 
even more important was the change in the “ethos” of governing.15 The contemporary 
policy state, they repeatedly assert, is characterized by a “problem-solving ethos.”16 
Policy, they emphasize, “is a commitment to a designated goal or course of action, made 
authoritatively on behalf of a given entity or collectivity, and accompanied by the 
guidelines for its accomplishment.”17 
The significance of this seemingly anodyne definition only becomes clear when 
                                                          
 9. Id. at 3. 
 10. See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017). 
 11. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 
(2010). 
 12. See SARAH L. STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
RETRENCHMENT (2015). 
 13. OREN & SKOWRONEK, supra note 8, at 9. 
 14. Id. at 10. 
 15. Id. at 106. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 27. 
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contrasted with the authors’ understanding of the non-policy regime. The pre-1900 Anglo-
American political system “proceeded for many centuries on the principles of rights, which 
we identify as the most encompassing counter motive to policy.”18 The authors “juxtapose 
those two systems—policy, limited but bent on expansion, and rights, socially entrenched 
but increasingly challenged.”19 
The attentive reader will quickly ask, what about the rights revolution of the 1960s? 
Isn’t the story of the growth of the policy state coterminous with the expansion of civil 
rights, consumer rights, welfare rights, environmental rights, and “rights-talk” in general? 
Orren and Skowronek’s reply constitutes one of the most interesting parts of their book. 
Although “the United States recognizes more rights today than it did previously . . . the 
nature of rights has changed.”20 Most importantly, these new rights are no longer 
“trumps,” but merely “chips.”21 Rather than set limits on what government can do, these 
new rights provide access and bargaining power to those seeking government benefits, 
services, and protections. This new understanding of rights creates an “opportunity 
structure” that allows policy entrepreneurs to advance their programs and enhance their 
power.22   
A good example of what they have in mind is the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975, which created the right of all children with disabilities to receive a 
“free appropriate public education.”23 In practice this created a process that significantly 
increased the power of parents and special education experts in devising “individualized 
educational plans” for one set of pupils—those deemed to have crossed the “disability” 
threshold.24 Outside of this process the new rights remain wholly undefined. 
We can understand the “policy state,” Orren and Skowronek maintain, only by 
contrasting it with the common law state which it displaced.25 The old regime amounted 
to rule by judges who established a variety of social hierarchies that could not be 
challenged by mere politicians: the rule of masters over slaves, men over women, and 
employers over workers. 
Placed in this historical context, it becomes clear that the “policy state” is founded 
on Progressive (with a capital P) principles, a product of the Progressives’ attack both on 
the limits imposed by the Madisonian Constitution and on the common law rights 
protected by the courts. Progressives were devoted to loosening all constitutional 
restraints; undermining traditional understandings of individual rights; promoting open-
ended, forward-looking innovation; and empowering experts who would make these many 
new programs “work” (whatever that would mean). 
With each branch and level of government engaged in such “collective problem 
solving,” they lost their distinctive constitutional roles.26 If legislators are problem-
                                                          
 18. OREN & SKOWRONEK, supra note 8, at 16. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 17. 
 21. Id. at 41. 
 22. Id. at 17 (emphasis in the original). 
 23. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 773, 94 Pub. L. 142 (1975). 
 24. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1414 (2004). 
 25. OREN & SKOWRONEK, supra note 8, at 95. 
 26. Id. at 6. 
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solvers, they must be prepared to revise laws quickly as new information becomes 
available—something we know is difficult in any legislative body, to say nothing of our 
bicameral Congress. If administrators are problem-solvers, they need to have the flexibility 
to issue provisional guidelines rather than just formal rules, and at times they will need to 
ignore legal provisions that have become outmoded or have proved to be unwise. Thus our 
current “government by waivers.” If judges are problem-solvers, they might need to step 
in when other have failed to act—as the Supreme Court did on global warming.27 And 
they must rewrite statutes they decide are not working well—as the Court did in the 1970s 
with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act28 and more recently with the Affordable Care Act.29 
One of the driving themes of The Policy State is that the Progressive understanding 
of governing that lies at the heart of the policy state has been a disaster, the main source 
of the “American predicament.” The policy state is now “trapped by its problem-solving 
instincts.”30 “A monument to pragmatism, the new American state dispels the myth of 
pragmatism: that problem solving can proceed with impunity, that the institutions of 
government are infinitely adaptable.”31 The result is the erosion of a government of laws, 
replaced by a government of ever-changing guidelines; and a government by consent of 
the governed displaced by the rule of technocrats. Our contemporary policy state is based 
on a myth, “what John Dewey referred to as ‘like-mindedness,’” that is, the “idea that 
public problems have rational solutions, that they should be addressed scientifically and 
with an eye toward fine-tuning down the line.”32 Consensus on what constitutes a problem 
and a “rational solution” simply does not exist. As a result, the policy state’s legitimacy is 
always under attack. 
Orren and Skowronek provides telling examples of how this problem-solving ethos 
has placed contradictory demands on all branches of government and required them to 
institute more and more elaborate “workarounds” to achieve barely tolerable results.33 In 
their section on “Makeshift Presidentialism” the authors quote the Progressive historian 
Henry Jones Ford: “‘The greatness of the presidency,’ he enthused, ‘was the work of the 
people breaking through the constitutional form.’”34 No doubt this sounded more 
appealing to Progressives in the age of Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson than it does 
to self-described progressives in the age of Trump. As the founders well understood, 
popular governments need constitutional limits to counter the ever-present danger of 
demagoguery. 
At times Orren and Skowronek sound like those conservative critics of 
progressivism we associate with Claremont and Hillsdale. But unlike the “Claremonsters” 
they do not defend the original Constitution, which they insist was not based on natural 
rights to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” but rather on common law rights that 
protected unjust social hierarchies. 
                                                          
 27. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 28. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
 29. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 30. OREN & SKOWRONEK, supra note 8, at 193. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 175. 
 33. Id. at 91. 
 34. Id. at 124. 
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One can agree with Orren and Skowroneck that the old regime was deeply flawed, 
especially on the issue of race, without accepting their insistence that the Madisonian 
Constitution was based on an intractable common law dedicated to the subjugation of 
African Americans, women, and workers. After all, a key feature of common law is that it 
evolves to address new problems and evidence—in effect, it envisions pragmatic problem-
solving by judges. Wasn’t it that eminent progressive, Oliver Wendell Holmes, who told 
us “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience”?35 Moreover, throughout 
the 19th century there was an on-going struggle between advocates of the common law 
and “codifiers.” Gradually statutes, often based on “model codes,” supplanted or redirected 
traditional elements of the common law. That famous canon of statutory interpretation—
”statutory provisions in derogation of the common law should be narrowly construed”—
was largely a rear-guard action against the “statutification” of the law. At the national level 
it has been a staple of jurisprudence that there is no federal common law, save for the 
common law of procedure in diversity cases first recognized in 184236 and abruptly 
abandoned in 1938.37 
The biggest problem with Orren and Skowronek’s insistence that the common law 
was the heart and soul of the old regime, though, is that the fact that Madison, Jefferson, 
and the other founders believed in natural rights—inalienable rights based not on judicial 
pronouncements, but on the “laws of nature and of nature’s God.”  If this is the foundation, 
then some elements of the common law must be overturned, most obviously those 
establishing the rights of slaveholders. If there was any doubt about this, the issue was 
resolved by the post-War amendments. The Progressive’s attack on the Constitution was 
not just an attack on an ossified common law in the name of collective problem-solving, 
but an attack on natural rights in the name of history.38 
The despair so apparent in the book’s final chapter result from the authors’ 
conclusion that Progressivism has led us to a dead-end and that the Constitution 
eviscerated by Progressivism was not worth saving.39 Their elevation of the common law 
over natural rights as the foundation of the Constitution leads them to part company with 
such thinkers as Lincoln, Martin Luther King, and Frederick Douglas, who saw the 
principles underlying the Declaration and the Constitution as condemning the practices 
that they—like Orren and Skowronek—for good reason despised. The Policy State does 
an excellent job identifying many of the pathologies of our current “predicament,” but may 
exaggerate their intractability. Its authors should take heart from a statement from Franklin 
Roosevelt they quote in Chapter 4: “Our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is 
possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement 
without loss of essential form.”40 
At first blush, Burbank and Fahang’s book does not lend itself to such speculation 
about regime principles. They focus on one small but important (and underappreciated) 
                                                          
 35. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Pereira & Beltran eds. 2011) (1881). 
 36. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
 37. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 38. See JAMES CEASER, NATURE AND HISTORY IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2008). 
 39. OREN & SKOWRONEK, supra note 8, at 151–98. 
 40. Id. at 105. 
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feature of “the policy state,” namely private suits to vindicate statutory rights.41 Farhang’s 
important book The Litigation State showed how large a role litigation by private parties 
plays in both interpreting and enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.42 Many law 
professors have described and bemoaned the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ tendency to 
restrict access to federal courts and limit the available judicial remedies.43 What Farhang 
and Burbank add are (1) an enlightening comparison of efforts in various forums to reduce 
litigation; and (2) a convincing quantitative look at Supreme Court decisions 
Burbank and Farhang devote one chapter to anti-litigation efforts in Congress, and 
another to similar efforts in the little-known but influential Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules.  Both campaigns proved largely ineffective. The legislative effort to scale back the 
litigation unleashed by new laws and court rulings in the 1960s and 1970s began during 
the Reagan Administration. Spearheaded by the Reagan Justice Department, this  
completely failed; indeed, Congress continued to pass legislation creating additional 
private rights of action. Since Democrats controlled the House during the Reagan years, 
they could block anything that managed to get through the Republican Senate. Important 
Republican constituencies—especially small business—feared that anti-litigation 
legislation would threaten their ability to challenge federal regulators. When Republicans 
took control of both houses in 1994, they restricted litigation affecting a few industries, 
but did nothing more sweeping than that. Much the same was true when Republicans 
controlled both houses under President George W. Bush. Burbank and Farhang offer a 
conventional but convincing argument for these events: the legislative process is full of 
veto points; this was a minor issue for Republicans but an extremely important one for 
interest groups affiliated with the Democratic party; and the Supreme Court took the steam 
out of legislative efforts by reducing access to the courts without any help from 
Congress.44 
Burbank and Farhang’s chapter on the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
introduces an important arena of rulemaking that almost no one other than legal procedure 
nerds (and Sarah Staszak) has ever paid much attention to.  In passing the Rules Enabling 
Act of 1934, Congress gave the Supreme Court authority to issue general rules regarding 
procedures used in federal court. To aid them the Court established the Advisory 
Committee, with members appointed by the Chief Justice. Not surprisingly, the Committee 
appointed by Chief Justice Warren expanded access to federal courts, most notably in class 
action suits. Chief Justice Burger—who once described the surge in litigation as the result 
of “mass neurosis”—made a concerted effort to reverse this trend. Burbank and Farhang 
provide a fascinating picture of the operation of this obscure quasi-administrative, quasi-
judicial, quasi-legislative committee—one that illustrates Orren and Skowronek’s point 
about the homogenization of the branches of government.  (When we are forced to invoke 
the term “quasi,” we can be sure that constitutional clarity has escaped us.) 
Despite Burger’s commitment, his efforts largely came to naught. Why? The 
                                                          
 41. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 10, at 43. 
 42. See FARHANG, supra note 11. 
 43. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 
78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003). 
 44. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 10, at 15. 
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authors’ answer is that the Advisory Committee feared that if it antagonized members of 
Congress, legislators might claw back the power delegated to the Supreme Court in 1934. 
Congress did in fact flex its muscle by requiring more transparency in the Committee’s 
deliberations. This, too, made large-scale change more difficult. The less insulated the 
institution, the more difficult retrenchment becomes. 
Burbank and Farhang’s chapters on Congress and the Advisory Committee examine 
the dogs that didn’t bark—at most they emitted occasional yips. That is not true of their 
chapter on the Supreme Court. They describe changes in Court doctrine on procedural 
matters ranging from the relatively well known (class actions) to the obscure (pleadings 
and offers of judgment) that make it more difficult for plaintiffs to win cases alleging 
violations of federal statutory rights. Using a Supreme Court database they constructed for 
this project, they find a marked decline in the number of pro-private enforcement ruling, 
especially after 1995.45 They also show that the Court’s liberals and conservatives often 
disagree on these issues, despite their seemingly technical nature. In fact, “Justices are now 
more ideologically divided over private enforcement issues than they are over federal 
rights issues in general.”46 
Burbank and Farhang’s most provocative argument is that the conservative members 
of the Court have cleverly chipped away at private enforcement through procedural rulings 
rather than eviscerate statutory rights more directly because these decisions receive less 
media and public attention.47 In a nutshell, the Court’s “counterrevolution” has been 
“subterranean.”48 Early in the book they write of the conservative legal movement, 
“Recognizing the political infeasibility of retrenching substantive rights, the movement’s 
strategy was to undermine the infrastructure for enforcing them.”49 That, they suggest, is 
exactly what the Supreme Court has been doing for well over two decades. Although they 
shy away from saying so directly, the authors clearly believe this judicial strategy is 
undesirable, even sleazy. 
While Burbank and Farhang offer convincing support for their central findings, they 
leave out three important parts of the story. The first is the even more “subterranean” 
origins of the procedural rulings subject to recent retrenchment. For example, under Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Title IV of the 
Social Security Act (creating Aid to Families with Dependent Children), and other 
important statutes, federal courts simply asserted, with hardly a word of explanation, that 
Congress had intended to create a private right of action. Regarding AFDC the Court later 
said, in effect, “gee, we never examined that question before, but it’s too late to turn back 
now.”50 On Title IX the Court’s argument amounted to “well, we did it for Title VI, and 
Title IX looks like Title VI”—overlooking the fact that they had never explained why there 
is a private right of action under Title VI either.51 When the Court began to restrict such 
                                                          
 45. Id. at 169. 
 46. Id. at 169. 
 47. Id. at 204. 
 48. Id. at 192. 
 49. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 10, at 3. 
 50. See Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); King v. Smith 392 U.S. 309 (1968); R. SHEP MELNICK, 
BETWEEN THE LINES:  INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 67 (1994). 
 51. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 695 (1979); see also MELNICK, supra note 4, at 48–53. 
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“implied” private rights of action, it provided much more extensive explanations, in part 
because the dissenters forced them to defend themselves.52 The readers should compare 
the extensive debate over private rights of action in Alexander v. Sandoval (2001) with the 
superficial treatment of the same issue in Lau v. Nichols (1974).53 Only in the former is 
there any serious discussion of the best way to enforce the federal law. In her aptly titled 
book Below the Radar: How Silence Can Save Civil Rights, Alison Gash shows how liberal 
judges have used even more “subterranean” methods for expanding the rights of gay and 
lesbian couples.54 This seems to be a regular feature of our “policy state,” not simply a 
lamentable strategy employed by conservative judges. 
Second, it is often impossible to separate the creation of rights from the procedures 
designed to enforce them. Many statutory rights cases involve the conditions placed on 
states that receive federal grants. Do these laws create individual rights enforceable in 
federal court? The statutes themselves seldom say so. In recent decades the Court has 
insisted that before an individual plaintiff can file suit under one of these grant-in-aid 
programs, he or she “must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely the violation 
of a federal law.”55 They must identify the “particular statutory provision” that “gives rise 
to a federal right,” and show that the right “is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that 
enforcement would strain judicial competence.”56 In other words, in many of instances the 
Court does not allow court-based enforcement for the simple reason that it finds no 
statutory right. During the 1960s and 1970s, in contrast, federal courts had used private 
rights of action to convert directives addressed to subnational governments into rights 
enforceable by private citizens. This often required the creative rewriting of statutes.57 In 
other words, what is usually at stake in these cases is not the appropriate method for 
enforcing well-defined rights, but the underlying definition of the rights themselves. 
The same is true in most discrimination cases. Take Title VII, a law central to the 
Burbank and Farhang study. What is the right at stake here? Not the right to a job, but 
rather the right not to be discriminated against by an employer. How do we know if 
discrimination has occurred? The most famous and important Title VII case, Griggs v. 
Duke Power,58 lays out a series of evidentiary tests, each with a particular burden of proof. 
A higher burden of proof at the first stage gives more leverage to the employer; a higher 
burden of proof at the next stage gives more leverage to the employee. In almost all 
discrimination cases the procedure for enforcement is so intertwined with the definition of 
the underlying right that it is impossible to distinguish them. To use Orren and 
                                                          
 52. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 695. 
 53. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
 54. See ALISON L. GASH, BELOW THE RADAR: HOW SILENCE CAN SAVE CIVIL RIGHTS (2015). 
 55. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (citing Golden State Transit Corp. v. L.A., 493 U.S. 
103, 106 (1989)) (emphasis added).  I discuss the significance of these cases in Institutions and Public Law: 
Comparative Approaches. See R. Shep Melnick, Deregulating States: The Political Jurisprudence of the 
Rehnquist Court, in INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES 83 (Ginsburg & Kagan, eds. 
2005). 
 56. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41 (quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 
431–32 (1987)).   
 57. The most dramatic example is AFDC, see R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING 
WELFARE RIGHTS 65–132 (1994). 
 58. See 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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Skowronek’s terms, these rights are almost always “chips” rather than “trumps.” 
Third, Burbank and Farhang offer no explanation for why conservative judges have 
sought to curtail litigation. Sometimes it is to stem the oft-cited “flood of litigation” that 
might result from a contrary ruling. Just as often these conservative judges seek to reduce 
the power of the federal government—especially federal administrators—to give 
commands to state and local governments. Sometimes (as the above quotation from Justice 
O’Connor in Blessing suggests) it is because they fear the courts are being drawn into 
issues about which they know little. Occasionally it is to induce Congress to speak more 
clearly. Every now and again the liberals on the Court will agree. As Farhang’s colleague 
Robert Kagan has shown, “adversarial legalism” has many drawbacks, few of which are 
acknowledged in this examination of what is essentially a counterrevolution against 
“adversarial legalism.”59 
Like all of us, Burbank, Farhang, Orren, and Skowronek are struggling to understand 
the confusing politics of big government, technocratic governance, political polarization, 
and (occasional) retrenchment. Taken together, they illustrate the shift from rights-as-
trumps to rights-as-chips, the homogenizing consequences of our “problem-solving 
ethos,” the prevalence of “subterranean” governance, and the public discontent that all of 
this has bred. As we confront the alarming implications and consequences of the 2016 
elections, they provide useful—but not reassuring—insights into “the American 
predicament.” 
 
                                                          
 59. See ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001). 
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